Zero Pricing Platform Competition by Shekhar, Shiva
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Zero Pricing Platform Competition
Shekhar, Shiva
March 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/99364/
MPRA Paper No. 99364, posted 07 Apr 2020 16:40 UTC
Zero pricing platform competition
Shiva Shekhar
∗
March 2020
This article studies competition between different types of ad-funded platforms
attracting consumers with free services. Consumers often find advertisements a
nuisance on such platforms. We study how under a competitive setting platforms
balance the tension between attracting consumers and rent extraction from the ad-
vertising side. We propose a flexible yet simple model that studies competition
between standard platforms and social media platforms (with same-side network
effects). We find that an increase in either positive same-side network effects or
an increase in consumer disutility from advertisements leads to a reduction in the
number of ads on that platform. When competing platforms merge, consumer side
network effects do not impact prices and the number of ads is higher. In a setting
where consumers present a negative (congestion) externality on each other, compe-
tition fails to protect consumer welfare and behaves erratically. Finally, we present
a few extensions and discuss some policy implications.
JEL Classification: L13, L22, L86, K21.
Keywords: Social media platforms, platforms, two-sided markets, same side net-
work effects, cross side network effects, advertising.
∗Compass Lexecon, Square de Meeus 23, Brussels, Belgium. email: shiva.shekhar.g@gmail.com. This is an
independent piece of research and is not necessarily the view of Compass Lexecon.
We thank Leonardo Madio for his insightful comments.
1
1 Introduction
Platforms funded by advertisements are becoming an increasingly important part of the digital
ecosystem. The services offered by such platforms are highly valued by consumers.1 These
platforms compete for consumer attention as the value of such consumers is the willingness
to pay for access to such consumers by advertisements.2 Google and Facebook are largest
such platforms adopting such a business model. These platforms are unanimously considered
dominant and competition between such platforms is a hotly debated topic in both academic
and policy-making circles.3 The zero pricing business model of such platforms presents a
particular challenge for anti-trust authorities to quantify effects on consumers and welfare.4
The tools available to competition authorities to quantify impact of a merger on competition
are based on a consumer facing price.5 The "zeroness" of the prices makes it hard to do so
while also suggesting the platforms have evolved and perhaps compete for consumers in other
dimensions.6
These platforms seek to attract consumers by offering the platform services or content for
free and earn through charging advertisers to access consumers. Advertisements on a platform
are often considered a nuisance by consumers and impact the quality of services on a platform.7
There is a tension between the network effects in play in such multi-sided markets. On the
one hand, advertisers value positively the interactions of consumers on a platform, on the
other hand, consumers negatively value advertisements on such platforms. There is a stream
of arguments that imply that competition in such markets might help regulate the intensity
of advertisements.8 Similarly, there is another stream that discusses consumer privacy as a
dimension of competition.9
The CMA in its recent market study on advertisement funded platforms identified two types
of platforms. The first being a standard platform which offers platform services to consumers
while placing advertisements within its content. Examples of such platforms include search
platforms, video streaming platforms like Youtube, Vimeo and Dailymotion. The second type
of platform is a social media platform where consumers join to interact, share and discover
engaging content. These markets apart from offering content also include the presence of
1See Brynjolfsson et al. (2019) for a detailed review on how consumers value such online services.
2See Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report, 2019 (2019) which suggests that the average advertising revenue
per user was 116.3 Australian Dollars for Google search and 72.8 Australian Dollars for Facebook in 2018.
3The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has released an interim report discussing ad-funded plat-
forms. A similar discussion can be found in the "Digital platforms inquiry: Final report" published by the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). Similarly, the Stigler report (Scott Morton
et al. (2019)) also discusses importance of such platforms. These reports concur that Facebook and Google
are dominant.
4The Bundeskartellamt (2019) points out that "Free" is not a special zone where Economics or anti-trust does
not apply. A free good is one where the seller has chosen to set a monetary price of zero and may set other,
non-monetary conditions or duties.
5See Evans (2011) for a detailed analysis on how some of the tools breakdown under zero prices.
6OECD (2018a) states that "...just because a firm is constrained in terms of the prices it can charge to a single-
option (zero) does not mean that it would not have the ability to affect unilaterally the terms of exchanges
with consumers to its benefits, and to consumers’ detriment", pg. 14.
7See Digital platforms interim report (2019) by CMA.
8OECD (2018a) suggests advertising intensity as a competitive tool. See para 61.
9See Esayas (2018) that also point out that both European Commission and the Federal Trade Commission
have acknowledge data privacy to be a non-price attribute of competition. Also, See EC Case M.8124-
Microsoft/LinkedIn. European Commission Decision C(2016)8404, 2016 (2019) case.
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another type of network effect through which they attract consumers. This network effect is
the same side network effect due to interaction with other consumers.10 11
In this paper, we try to understand how competition functions under the business model of
"zero" consumer facing prices used by such platforms. We employ a tractable yet very flexible
model that allows us to understand competition between the different types of platforms. This
model allows us to seamlessly switch between two types of such platforms: a standard platform
which offers content or services to consumers and a social medial platform where same-side
network effects play a role. In a competitive setting, the interaction of these network effects
reveals interesting insights. We look at three types of competitive settings, firstly, competition
between two standard platforms, secondly, competition between two social media platforms
and finally, competition between a social media platform and a standard platform.
We confirm that advertising intensity can be used as a competitive tool by firms to attract
consumers on a platform.12 This can be observed through the pricing response of platforms.
A unilateral increase in advertising prices at a platform, reduces advertising demand at that
platform. This makes it relatively more attractive for consumers and results in consumer mi-
gration away from the rival platform. This in turn entails a negative impact on the advertising
demand at the rival platform. We denote this as the "negative advertising externality". The
rival platform responds by increasing its advertising price to attract consumers. As competition
for consumers gets fiercer, platforms experience an upward pricing pressure on their advertis-
ing prices. Thus, we reveal an indirect channel of competition between platforms to attract
consumers. We find that an increase in consumer disutility for advertisements or an increase
in same-side network effects leads to higher advertising prices. Moreover, in comparison to
a setting where two standard platform compete, competition (for consumers) between two
social-media platforms is fiercer. This is evidenced by a higher advertising price in the latter
competitive setting.
The impact of mergers between such platforms has become an important topic of discussion
in both academic, policymaking and the political circles.13 Therefore, we try to understand
how a merger between competing advertising funded platforms impacts competition. Specif-
ically, how consumers are impacted in markets and what competitive channels are shut off
post-merger. We find that a merger between either two competing standard platforms or two
social media platforms makes platform advertising price indifferent to consumer disutility from
advertisements or same-side network effect. The intuition is that the merged entity internalizes
the "negative advertising externality" on its rival due to an increase in its price. This paints a
stark picture of a merger outcome for consumers. These dominant platforms provide extremely
valuable services and consumers might not have other credible outside options and can be ex-
ploited easily. We also discuss potential remedies whereby the competition regulator can put
10The Bundeskartellamt in the Facebook (2019) decision described such platforms as
"It can be assumed that there is a specific demand for social networks, which is fundamentally different from
the demand for other social media. The key purpose of social networks in finding and network with people
the users already know, and to exchange on a daily basis experiences, opinions and contents among specific
contacts which the users define based on identity."
11Also, see Online platforms and digital advertising Market study: interim report, 2019 (2019) that discusses
the presence of both same-side and cross-side network effects on social media platforms.
12See OECD (2018a) pg, 15 for a discussion on it.
13See Argentesi, Buccirossi, Calvano, Duso, Marrazzo & Nava (2019), Gautier & Lamesch (2020), Ex-post
Assessment of Merger Control Decisions in Digital Markets, 2019 (n.d.) and Digital Platforms Inquiry:
Final Report, 2019 (2019).
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caps on advertisements and (reasonable) data extraction limits. We then discuss its impact on
welfare, consumers and advertisers.
We present multiple extensions to the paper that illustrate the flexibility of the model. In
particular, the case of consumer congestion externality is considered where consumers value
negatively the presence of one another. We find that competition fails to protect consumer
interest and, in some cases, ( when consumers value advertisements positively) leads to a fall
in welfare on both the sides of the market. This is because platform try to divert the marginal
consumer away from that platform. In the case when consumers positively value advertisement,
a platform reduces its relative attractiveness for the marginal consumer by reducing the mass of
(positively valued) advertisements. By doing so, consumers are worse-off as well as advertising
firms. This presents a unique case where a merger to monopoly would results in an increase
in consumer welfare and advertising side welfare. Finally, we look at the case of multi-homing
consumers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature and our contri-
butions to it. Section 3 introduces the model and the analysis is presented in section 4. Section
5 discusses a setting where competing platforms merger and section 6 discusses the extensions.
We conclude with section 7.
2 Related Literature
The paper is related to the two-sided literature where seminal works include Armstrong (2006),
Rochet & Tirole (2003), Rochet & Tirole (2006). We assume a competitive bottleneck where
consumers single-home (see Armstrong (2006)) where a platform is a bottleneck for access to
consumers by advertisers where consumers are offered platform service/content for "free" and
platforms charge an advertising prices.
We also add to the discussion on competition in advertising funded platforms where consumer
facing price is not a competitive parameter. There has been a vast literature on advertising
funded TV and newspaper networks.The choice of content is discussed in Steiner (1952) ,
Beebe (1977) which adds competition to the Steiner (1952) model and Spence & Owen (1977)
which also looks at competition. There exists a strand of literature that models consumers
as finding advertisements a nuisance and is an implicit price paid by consumers (see Wilbur
(2008), Anderson & Gabszewicz (2006), Crampes et al. (2009), Huang et al. (2018)). Recent
literature on zero pricing platforms includes Anderson & Jullien (2015), Anderson & Peitz
(2020) and Calvano & Polo (2020). We add to this literature by looking advertising as an
implicit price paid by consumers. We try to understand how competition behaves in a model
where cross-side negative externality interacts with same-side effects (where consumers value
or dislike other consumers). We also add to the two-sided literature by proposing a simple yet
very flexible model that allows seamless transition between different competitive settings. One
is able to study a multitude of competitive settings where competition is between social-media
platforms, between content/service provision platforms and between asymmetric platforms.
Using indicator functions, one is able to easily switch between regimes and understand the
indirect competitive links between platforms. This model also complements the interesting
literature on two-sided markets with same-side network effects and cross-side network effects
such as Belleflamme & Peitz (2019b) and Angelini et al. (2019). We include negative same-side
network effects which can be used a proxy for competition between agents.
We also add to the discussion on mergers in digital platforms. There has been a lot of atten-
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tion on mergers in digital markets and the associated impact on consumers and data protection.
Recent works include Stucke & Grunes (2015), Waehrer (2016), Argentesi, Buccirossi, Calvano,
Duso, Marrazzio & Nava (2019), Prat & Valletti (2019), Gautier & Lamesch (2020), Motta &
Peitz (2020). We look at the impact of a horizontal merger by two platforms and how their
pricing incentives and strategies change. We find that post-merger advertising intensity rises
and hurts consumer surplus. We present a stark picture where post-merger consumer prefer-
ences are ignored by platforms in favor of increasing platform profits. We find that consumers
might experience significant harm due to the indispensability of the platforms and change in
platform incentives in favor of advertising firms.
3 The Model
We model competition between two platforms in a differentiated setting with platforms denoted
by i ∈ {1, 2} from the perspective of consumers. These platforms provide "free" services to
consumers and follow an ad-based business model. In other words, they cater users’ eyeballs
to advertisers, which pay an ad price. However, consumers find advertisement a nuisance and
platforms set advertising prices which control the level of advertisements. These platforms set
advertising price to balance the consumer attraction with rent extraction to maximize profits.
Consumers. Consumers are continuously distributed according to their preferences where
s denotes the measure of the relative consumer preference for platform 2 against 1. These
preferences are distributed according to a cumulative density function F (·) with density f(·)
which is symmetric around 0 in the interval s ∈ {s, s}, with s = −s < 0. Hereafter, we refer to
′s′ as the consumer type.
Consumers obtain access to platform services for free and platforms are funded by advertise-
ments which are considered a nuisance by consumers. When consumers affiliate with a given
platform, they obtain a value (v) independent of network externalities. They value interactions
with other consumers on a platform denoted by the marginal gain θ per consumer affiliated
with the platform. Consumers obtain a disutility from advertisements on a platform which is
denoted by a negative externality from the presence of advertisers (γ) on the platform.14
It is important to point out that in such platforms, consumers access the platform for "free".
Consumers indirectly compensate a platform through their presence and the discomfort of
advertisements. The platform leverages its consumers base to charge a price to advertisers for
access to those consumers.
The total utility of a type-s consumer from joining the merged platform 1 in market is:
u1 = v + g1 · θED1 − γA1 − s/2
where g1 = 1(0) takes a unit value if platform 1 is a ad-funded platform with same side
network effect, else it takes a value of 0. We denote by A1 the number of advertisers active on
the platform 1 by ED1 the consumer belief on the total mass of consumers affiliating with a
platform. Similarly, the utility a consumer s enjoys by patronizing platform 2 is the same as
14See OECD (2018a) pg. 6. Also See OECD (2018b). They both discuss the generally negative impact of
advertising has on consumers. Also, see Online platforms and digital advertising Market study: interim
report, 2019 (2019) which suggests that an increase in advertising on a platform implies degraded quality
on the platform, pg. 57, pg. 87.
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before
u2 = v + g2 · θED2 − γA2 + s/2.
where g2 is the indicator function that takes a unit value if platform 2 is an ad-funded platform
else it takes value of 0. We denote by A2 the number of advertisers active on the platform 2
and the consumer belief on the total mass of consumers affiliating with a platform as ED2.
Consumers prefer to join platform 1 over platform 2 whenever u1 > u2 or
s < s∗ := θ(g1 · ED1 − g2 · ED2)− γ(A1 − A2) (1)
The demand for platform 1 is represented by all consumers with s < s∗ and the remaining
consumers will join platform 2. Hence,
D1 = F (s
∗) D2 = 1− F (s
∗). (2)
The demand denoted by F (s) has the following properties.
Assumption 1. F (·) is smooth, with strictly positive density function f(·). F (·) is symmetric
around zero and is such that the monotone hazard rate f(s)
1−F (s)
is increasing with s.
Advertisers. On the other (advertiser’s) side of the market, advertisers launch ad campaigns
on a platform given the price set by platforms. We model advertisers as firms that benefit from
interactions with consumers. The value of such interactions is denoted by φ for the advertisers.
These represent a measure of the cross network benefits in this side of the market. These
advertising firms are charged a price pi for affiliating with a platform and accessing the mass
of consumers on that platform.
Advertisers are distributed according to their type (k ∈ [0,∞)) with a cdf Λ(·) and density
λ(·). These advertiser types can be understood as the entry costs or as an outside option that
these advertisers face when joining each platform.
The utility of advertiser of type k when joining platform i is vi = φDi − pi − k, and they
do so for any vi > 0, that is for any k < ki := φDi − pi. Everything else constant, the mass
of advertisers on a platform rises when φ rises and falls in the price charged by the platform
for access to consumers. For simplicity, we ignore increasing returns to scale (or entry cost
synergies) for the fringe firms. These synergies only increase the incidence of multihoming
fringe firms while our main results are unchanged.
As a result, the mass of advertisers on platform i is
Ai = Λ(ki).
Assumption 2. Λ(·) is smooth, with strictly positive density function λ(·) and λ′(·) > 0.
The economic intuition behind λ′ > 0 is that there are larger number of advertisers with
relative higher cost of advertising than low-cost ones. Also, this is a sufficient condition for the
monotone hazard rate to be increasing in k.
Platforms. The CMA describes the platforms we study in this paper in their recent report.15
These platforms compete to attract consumers by offering their core services for free. Once
15See Online platforms and digital advertising Market study: interim report, 2019 (2019).
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they acquire a critical mass of consumers, they make money from business users on another
side of the platform.16 As in the report, platforms are advertising funded and do not charge
consumers for access to the platform services. Instead, the platforms act as a bottleneck for
advertisers for access to consumers. They charge advertisers a fee for accessing consumers on
the platform. We study two types of such platforms. Firstly, platforms that content/service
oriented which are denoted by the indicator function gi = 0. Secondly, platforms that also offer
consumers a network benefit from interacting with each other gi = 1. These platforms exhibit
same-side network effects denoted by θ.17
The platforms decide on the advertising price to maximize their profit which is given by the
expression below
Πi(gi, gj) = pi · Ai. (3)
We further assume the following to ensure an interior pricing solution.
Assumption 3. We assume that 1 > f(s)(θ(g1 + g2)− γφλ(k))
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, platforms set prices to ad-
vertisers simultaneously. In the second stage, advertisers and consumers decide simultaneously
which platform to join.
4 Analysis
The indicator functions (g1, g2) make the model very flexible and allow us to study a large
variety of competitive settings such a competition between: two standard platforms, two social
media platforms, a social media platform and a standard platform and platforms with consumer
congestion externality. Before we proceed to a type of competitive setting, we discuss the
characteristics shared by these advertising funded platforms.
Regardless of the type of platform competition, a platform i sets price levels to maximize
profits. The first order conditions for a platform setting prices are given as follows:
∂Πi(gi, gj)
∂pi
=Ai(gi, gj) + pi
∂Ai(gi, gj)
∂pi
= 0 (4)
with ∂Ai(gi,gj)
∂pi
< 0 which is ensured by Assumption 3.
We discuss the impact of a unilateral price increase by a platform i on consumer and adver-
tising demand in the market in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. A unilateral increase in advertising price by platform i affects market demands in
the following way:
∂Ai(gi, gj)
∂pi
< 0,
∂Aj(gj, gi)
∂pi
< 0
∂Di(gi, gj)
∂pi
> 0,
∂Dj(gj, gi)
∂pi
< 0
16Examples of such platforms are abundant such as Youtube, Facebook, search engines and many others. See
CMA interim report
17The model allows us to look at the two cases, when consumers obtain a positive value from other consumers and
the case when consumers obtain a disutility from the presence of others which we call consumer congestion.
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Proof. See Appendix 9.1
The above result shows that a unilateral increase in price at a platform leads to an increase
in consumer demand, a decrease in advertising demand as well as a decrease in advertising
demand at the rival platform. The intuition for the above result is as follows. The direct
impact of an increase in advertising price by platform i is lowered advertising intensity on that
platform. This results in an increase in consumer demand for that platform. This increase in
consumer demand at platform i results in a decrease in consumer demand at platform j which
reduces the amount of advertisements of platform j. The decrease in advertising demand at
the rival platform (j) due to a price increase on platform i is a unique link that we illustrate in
this paper. This link is further compounded by the presence and intensity of same-side network
effects. This is because under these network effects (θ) an additional consumers increases
the attractiveness of a platform to advertisers in two ways. Firstly, a consumer by joining a
platform increases the attractiveness of that platform (to advertisers). Secondly, once it joins
a platform due to the positive same-side network effect it further attracts more consumers
to that platform which further increases the attractiveness of that platform. Therefore, the
value of a consumer to a platform is the sum of the value generated by that consumers on that
platform and all the other consumers it potentially attracts. This is expected to result in fiercer
competition between platforms to attract consumers. In the next subsections, we discuss the
different market configurations and the ensuing competition.
In following subsections, we first look at the pricing strategy for the case when two standard
advertising funded platforms (g1 = g2 = 0) compete. Then, we look at the case when two
advertisement funded social media platforms (g1 = g2 = 1) compete. Finally, we also look
at the asymmetric case when a social media platform competes with a standard advertising
funded platform (g1 = 1, g2 = 0).
18
4.1 Competition between standard advertising funded platforms
In this subsection, we have in mind competition between platforms that earn through advertise-
ments and do not have same-side network effects. Examples of such platforms include Youtube,
Vimeo and Dailymotion. This is the case when g1 = g2 = 0. We abstract away from competi-
tion in platform services and assume, for all practical purposes the platforms have very similar
content. Instead, we focus on advertisement pricing when advertising is viewed as a nuisance
by consumers. The platforms compete for consumers by choosing the mass of active advertisers
on a platform by setting advertising prices appropriately.
The first order conditions are described in 5. We discuss a symmetric equilibrium in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 2. The equilibrium price is symmetric and given as
p∗1 = p
∗
2 = p
∗ = Λ(k∗)
1 + 2f(0)γφλ(k∗)
λ(k∗)[1 + f(0)γφλ(k∗))]
where k∗ = φ/2 − p∗. The corresponding consumer demand and advertisement demand on a
platform are D∗1 = D
∗
2 = F (0) = 1/2 and A
∗
1 = A
∗
2 = Λ(k
∗) respectively.
18This case provides insights on a setting where there is a dominant platform that exerts market power vis a
vis the rival.
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Proof. See Appendix 9.2.
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium and discuss the various network effects impact prices
in the presence of competition. The following lemma describes the comparative static of prices
in the network effects.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium advertising price on a platform is rising in the consumer
nuisance from advertisers (γ).
Proof. See appendix 9.3
The above result is very intuitive. An increase in γ implies consumers have a higher disutility
from the presence of advertisers on a platform. This creates a pressure on the platform to
increase its advertising price to attract consumers on the platform. An increase in price leads
to a fall in the mass of advertisers active on a platform resulting in a fall in advertiser surplus.
4.2 Competition between social media platforms
In this subsection, we look at the case where two social media platforms compete. This is the
case when (g1 = g2 = 1). The main difference between a social media platform (SMP) and
a standard advertising funded platform is that consumers on a SMP also value the presence
of other consumers on that platform. This is what we call same-side network effects denoted
by θ > 0. In this subsection, we try to understand how consumers’ value from the interaction
with other consumers (θ > 0) on that platform impacts prices and competition. In this setting,
both same-side and cross-side network effects jointly impact prices. These two types of network
effects impact consumer utility in opposite direction and hence one might conjecture that they
impact consumer prices also in opposing directions. This subsection helps understand how this
tension between the two opposing effects impacts competition and advertising prices.
Lemma 3. In the case when (g1 = g2 = 1), the equilibrium prices are symmetric and given as
p∗1 = p
∗
2 = p
∗ = Λ(k∗)
1− 2f(0)[θ − γφλ(k∗)]
λ(k∗)[1− f(0)(2θ − γφλ(k∗))]
and
D∗1 = D
∗
2 = F (0) = 1/2
and
A∗1 = A
∗
2 = Λ(φ/2− p
∗)
Proof. See Appendix 9.4.
One can notice that same-side network effects (θ) play an important role in the pricing
strategy of a SMP. To further understand how same-side network effects interact with the
cross-side network effects in the model, we do some comparative statics of prices with respect
to θ and γ.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium advertising prices on a platform
• are rising in θ unambiguously.
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• are rising in γ if 1 > 2θf(s∗). Else, prices are falling in γ.
Proof. See appendix 9.5
We find that a rise in consumer valuation due to the presence of other consumers increases
competition for consumers between platforms and leads to a reduction in the number of active
advertisers. The intuition for this is the following. An increase in θ makes every consumer
that affiliates with a platform more valuable. Every consumer that joins a platform has a
higher attraction effect on other consumers. This leads to platforms aggressively competing for
consumers. This competition for consumers is through increasing advertising prices to reduce
the mass of active advertisers which in turn might attract consumers. This result shows that an
increase in the same-side network effect increases competition and actually reduces consumer
nuisance generating advertising.
A rise in γ implies increased consumer sensitivity to advertisement intuitively should result
in a fall in advertisement through increased prices. However, we find that it is not so straight-
forward as in the case without same side network externalities (i.e. θ = 0). Specifically, we find
that for sufficiently small levels of same-side network externalities, for θ < 1
2f(s∗)
, advertising
price rises and the total mass of advertisers falls. This result is similar to the case without
same-side network externalities. Interestingly, we find that the opposite occurs if θ is large
enough. Specifically, for θ > 1
2f(s∗)
, we find an increase in γ leads to increase in advertisement.
These results hold in a simple Hotelling set-up. We find that for t > θ, prices are falling in γ
and vice versa.
Consumer surplus and Media see-saws An increase in same-side network effect increases
consumer surplus. The increase in consumer surplus is two fold. Firstly, a direct effect of an
increase in the same-side network effects increases the utility of consumers from the presence
of rivals. Secondly, there is an indirect channel that increases consumer surplus through an
increase in advertising price resulting in lower advertising intensity. This leads to a fall in
advertising side surplus. The media See-Saw exists when θ rises.
The effect of an increase in consumer aversion to advertisements (γ) leads to ambiguous
results on consumer surplus as in the case of g1 = g2 = 0. As before, for 1 > 2θf(s
∗), there
is a tension between the negative direct effect and the positive indirect effect of an increase in
γ. In contrast, for the case when 1 > 2θf(s∗), the fall in consumer surplus is unambiguous
as the indirect effect is also negative. In case when 1 > 2θf(s∗), firm surplus is falling (due
to advertising prices rising in γ) as well as consumer surplus. In this case, the Media See-Saw
does not exist. On the other hand when 1 < 2θf(s∗), producer surplus rises while consumer
surplus falls with a rise is γ. In this case, we find that the Media See-Saw exists.
4.3 Competition between a social media platform and a standard
advertising funded platform
In this subsection, we try to understand the competition between two different types of adver-
tising funded platforms such as a standard platform and a social media platform. We assume
that platform 1 is a social media platform (g1 = 1) and platform 2 is a standard advertising
funded platform (g2 = 0). The competition between social media platform, θ > 0, and a
standard content driven platform is asymmetric. All else equal, the market is tilted towards
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favoring the social media platform. This case allows us to study how market power of platforms
impacts platform competition and consumers.
The first order conditions for the two platforms are given as follows:
∂Π1(1, 0)
∂p1
=A1(1, 0) + p1
λ(k1)[f(sˆ
∗)(θ − γφλ(k2))− 1]
1− f(s∗)(θ − γφ(λ(k1) + λ(k2)))
= 0
∂Π2(0, 1)
∂p2
=A2(0, 1) + p2
λ(k2)[f(sˆ
∗)(θ − γφλ(k1))− 1]
1− f(s∗)(θ − γφ(λ(k1) + λ(k2)))
= 0
(5)
For ease of explanation, for this case we exploit a simple set up with uniform distribution for
consumers and advertisers.
Lemma 4. The prices are asymmetric and given as pˆ∗1(1, 0) > pˆ
∗
2(0, 1) and D
∗
1(1, 0) > D
∗
2(0, 1)
and A∗1(1, 0) > A
∗
2(0, 1)
Proof. See Appendix 9.10.1.
Interestingly, a higher advertising price at the social media platform vis a vis the standard
platform does leads to a higher mass of active advertisers on the social-media platform. This
higher advertising price is mainly due to its ability to attract a greater mass of consumers (due
to θ) and hence also a greater mass of advertisers. It is the asymmetric form of competition
that creates a "quality" differential between the two platforms and the affords the social media
platform ability to charge a higher price whilst attracting a larger mass of consumers and
advertisers.
In a symmetric competition set-up, a higher advertising price is an indication of fiercer
competition for consumers and lower mass of advertising. It is straightforward to notice that the
advertising price in a symmetric social media competition set-up is higher than the symmetric
standard advertising platform set-up. The presence of same-side network effects increases
competition for consumers and hence higher prices to advertisers. Interestingly, we find that
the advertising price of the social media platform in the asymmetric set-up is higher than
the price in the symmetric set-up. In this case, the reason for the higher price is its market
power due to its better ability to attract consumers. As discussed in the previous paragraph,
this increased price does not imply lower advertising demand but rather higher advertising
demand than the symmetric case where competition is between two standard platforms i.e.
A1(1, 0) > A1(0, 0) > A1(1, 1). This result is similar to the classical case of competition
between vertically differentiated firms where the higher quality firm sets higher prices as well
as attracts a larger mass of consumers.
4.3.1 Market power and Consumer exploitation
The presence of θ > 0 implies that the social media platform has an advantage in attracting
consumers vis a vis its rivals. This same-side effect parameter can be used as a proxy for market
power impacts the players in the market and affects competition. This exercise albeit simple
provides insightful results. The following proposition summarizes the insights.
Proposition 3. An increase in market power θ > 0 of platform 1 leads to
• ∂p1
∂θ
> 0, ∂A1
∂θ
> 0 and ∂D1
∂θ
> 0, ∂Π1
∂θ
> 0.
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• ∂p2
∂θ
< 0, ∂A2
∂θ
< 0, ∂D1
∂θ
< 0 and ∂Π2
∂θ
< 0.
The above proposition shows how increased market power of a platform affects the market.
In this setting, market power is the ability of a platform to attract a larger mass of consumers
than the rival all else equal. We find that an increase in market power of platform 1 results
in an increase in advertising price along with an increase in advertising intensity on that plat-
form. The advertised intensity is however not large enough to reduce consumer demand at
the dominant platform. Therefore, consumer demand rises on the social media platform. This
result is actually aligned with what is currently observed in the market. The advertising price
on dominant platforms is consistently higher than its rival.19 Moreover, the dominant platform
profit increases while the rival’s profit falls with an increase in θ. This is because an increase
in θ leads to an increase in consumer attraction of consumers which then leads to an increase
in advertising on the platform albeit at a higher price. The rival platform is handicapped in
its ability to attract consumers and must therefore set lower advertising prices to compensate
advertisers active on the platform.
Case study: Google and Bing The search and query market is characterized by two main
players, Google and Bing, that have a market share of above 4%. Google is by far the dominant
player in this market with consistent market shares of over 90% in most jurisdictions with Bing
being a distant second with a market share of 5%. Google’s dominance and ability to attract
a larger audience through better search results are self-propagating. A larger consumer base
allow it to improve its search algorithm which further attracted new consumers. This advantage
confers on google a significant market power which is self-reinforcing. The proxy for market
power, θ, also behaves similar to the dominance of Google from a larger user base. This is
because in the search and query market, an increase in the number of consumers active on
the platform improves search results on the platforms and further attracts new consumers.20
This results in a cycle that is hard to break by a rival. This is observed by the consistently
higher advertising prices Google charges advertisers in comparison to Bing.21 Moreover, Google
also has much higher advertising demand and consumer demand which confirms the results we
obtain in a dominant platform setting. This anecdotal evidence provides some confirmation to
the results we find in the case where one platform has market power.
5 Merger between competing platforms
In this subsection, we try to understand how a merger between two competing digital plat-
form impacts advertising pricing on platforms. There has been a lot of discussion on the
Facebook/Instagram merger and its implications for competition.22 Specifically, recent reports
suggest that the limited ability of advertisers to negotiate and the large market power of plat-
forms make advertisers vulnerable. It is suggested that platforms like Facebook and Google
have the ability to charge more than if competition was effective.23 We provide evidence that
19See CMA interim report for the difference in cost per click for Google searech and Bing search, pg. 167.
20See Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report, 2019 (2019), pg. 66.
21See Online platforms and digital advertising Market study: interim report, 2019 (2019) figure 5.4, pg 167.
22For a comprehensive list of mergers in digital markets, see Gautier & Lamesch (2020) and Argentesi, Buc-
cirossi, Calvano, Duso, Marrazzo & Nava (2019).
23See Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report, 2019 (2019) discussion on page 119. Also, see Online platforms
and digital advertising Market study: interim report, 2019 (2019), pg. 150.
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this might not be the case. Instead, market power of platforms gained through mergers actually
reduces advertising price and aligns the incentive of the platform with the advertising side.24
In this section, we suppose that platforms 1 and 2 merge and then look at how this impacts
pricing strategy of firms.25 We then do comparative static for the case when two platforms are
standard ad-funded platforms and social-media ad-funded platforms.
The merged entity sets prices to maximize its profit denoted by
max
p1,p2
ΠM = p1A1 + p2A2 (6)
The platforms sets prices at platform i that solve the following FOCs
∂ΠM
∂pi
= Ai + pi
∂Ai
∂pi
pj
∂Aj
∂pi
= 0 (7)
Post merger, the (merged) platform now internalizes the externality it generates on the rival
when setting prices (i.e. pj
∂Aj
∂pi
). The impact of such internalization on prices is discussed in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The symmetric equilibrium advertising price of the merged entity is lower than
the case when they are separated i.e., pM∗1 = p
M∗
2 := p
M < p∗. This results in a larger total
mass of active advertisers post-merger AM∗1 = A
M∗
2 > A
∗
The above result is obtained by substituting the prices in the case of separation into the
FOCs, we get
∂ΠM
∂p1
|p1=p2=p∗ = p2
∂A2
∂p1
< 0.
The above is negative as ∂A2
∂p1
< 0. This results in post-merger prices for advertisers being set
lower than the case when the two platforms were separate entities. This is because a merged
platform internalizes the negative impact of an increase in its price on the rival platforms
advertisement demand. In particular, an increase in price of advertisements by a platform
results in decrease in active advertisers on that platform which attracts consumers towards
that platform. In turn, this leads to a fall in advertising demand on the rival platform. Post
merger, the negative impact of an increase in price on the rival is internalized resulting in lower
prices post-merger than the case when the two-platforms were separated. These results are
valid regardless of the case if the two merging platforms were standard platforms (g1 = g2 = 0)
or social media platforms (g1 = g2 = 1). Next, we try to understand how these prices are
affected by the network effects. We summarise the comparative static of prices in the following
proposition.
24We do not specifically suggest that advertisers obtain more surplus. This is because the advertising side is
fraught with a lack of transparency and includes multi-stages between the advertisers and the platform. Any
accrual of benefits on the advertising side to advertisers will be subject to competition on the advertising
supply chain. Therefore, any lack of accrual of advertising benefits to actual might not be due to the lack
of competition between platforms but a lack of competition in the supply chain. In the paper, we abstract
away from modeling competition in the supply chain and only look at surplus in the advertising side. For a
detailed description of the ad-tech supply chain, see Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report, 2019 (2019),
pg. 152.
25For expositional purposes, we look at symmetric competition case. A detailed analysis of the asymmetric
competition setting (g1 6= g2) can be produced upon request.
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Proposition 5. For g1 = g2 = g ∈ {0, 1}, the post-merger prices are not affected by a change in
same-side network effects (∂p
M,∗
∂θ
= 0) and consumer nuisance from advertisement (∂p
M,∗
∂γ
= 0).
Proof. See appendix 9.6.
We describe below how the above results contrast with the pre-merger competitive case when
competition is between two standard advertising funded platforms and social media platforms.
The above results show that an increase in γ does not impact the post-merger price. When
platforms compete an increase in consumer sensitivity to advertisement leads to an increase in
advertising price. If the price at a platform is not increased, the rival platform would increase
the price attract consumers due to lower advertising activity on the platform. This leads to
an upward pressure on advertising prices. However, post-merger this is not the case. This is
because post-merger platform internalizes the negative effect of an increase in advertising price
on the rival platform’s profit. This neutralizes the upward pricing pressure and as a result
platform prices do not change with a change in the consumer disutility from the presence of
advertisers on a platform.
The proposition below discusses how platform profits are impacted with a change in adver-
tising side network benefit.
Proposition 6. Platform profits rise with advertising side network benefits. In particular,
∂ΠM
∂φ
> 0.
The proof for the above can be seen in direct effect of an increase in φ on platform profits.
The direct effect of an increase in φ is given as
∂ΠM
∂φ
=
∂pmi
∂φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
AMi + p
M
i
∂AMi
∂φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+pMj
∂AMj
∂φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
> 0
An increase in φ results in an increase in advertising price and advertising demand on both
the differentiated entities of the merged platform. This is because an increase in φ implies
increased per consumer value to advertisers after taking into account the effect of an increased
price. This allows platforms to extract a portion of that gain. An increase in φ leads to an
increase in platform profits as well as an increase in advertising side surplus. This implies
profit of the platform and the advertising side are aligned post-merger. This is in contrast to
the discussion in the recent reports regarding market power of platforms vis a vis advertisers.
A merger actually aligns the incentives of the these two players. Any lack of accrual of benefits
to the advertisers could just be the competition intensity along the ad-tech supply chain.26 In
the following subsection, we discuss the impact on consumers, potential theories of harm and
the associated remedies.
5.1 Discussion on consumer surplus and privacy concerns
A merger between competing zero-pricing platforms provides new insights into the impact of
a merger on consumers and advertisers. In particular, we find that post-merger advertising
prices are not impacted by consumer side externalities, neither both positive same-side effects
(consumer benefit from the presence of other consumers, θ) nor cross-side consumer disutility
26See Biglaiser et al. (2019) for a detailed description of the supply chain, pg. 152.
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(consumer nuisance from advertisements, γ). The advertising price is only impacted by the
firm side positive network effect, φ. Furthermore, the advertising price is lower post-merger
than the competitive setting resulting in a higher mass of active advertising firms. This is
because firms do not compete to attract consumers resulting in an increase in advertisements
beyond competitive levels while disregarding consumer disutility. The merged platform sets
advertising prices to maximize its profits which also increase advertiser profits as the total
mass of advertisers increases. The following proposition discusses the impact of the merger on
the consumers’ and advertisers’ side.
Proposition 7. The merger of two platforms leads to a fall in consumer surplus and a rise in
advertiser surplus.
The following discussion will endeavor to quantify the effects of a merger on consumers and
advertisers. The change in consumer surplus when consumer join platform 1 between the
pre-merger and post-merger scenario is given as
CS∗1 − CS
M∗
1 =
∫ 0
s
[
θg1(D
∗
1 −D
M∗
1 )− γ(A
∗
1 − A
M∗
1 )
]
f(s)ds
CS∗1 − CS
M∗
1 =γ(A
M∗
1 − A
∗
1)/2 > 0
(8)
The second expression is obtained taking into account the fact that under a symmetric equi-
librium D∗1 = D
M∗
1 = 1/2 and the total mass of advertisers active on platform 1 post-merger
is larger than pre-merger, AM∗1 > A
∗
1. The above result provides us with the harm associated
with a merger to consumers. Since platforms do not charge a price, the harm arises due to
increased advertisement levels on a platform post-merger. The same exercise can be repeated
for platform 2. Therefore, one finds that consumer surplus falls post-merger. Next, we look at
the impact on advertisers’ side.
The advertising side surplus is given as follows:
PS∗1 − PS
M∗
1 =
∫ k∗
1
0
[
φ (D∗1 −D
M∗
1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
− (p∗1 − p
M∗
1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
]
λ(k)dk −
∫ kM∗
1
k∗
1
[
φDM∗1 − p
M∗
1 − k
]
λ(k)dk < 0
(9)
The above expression clearly demonstrates the increase in advertising side surplus post-merger
as D∗1 = D
M∗
1 = 1/2 and p
∗
1 > p
M∗
1 . The increase in advertising side surplus is two-fold. The
advertisers types already active on platform 1 pre-merger (k < k∗) obtain a reduction in prices
while consumer demand at the platform does not change. Secondly, there is an expansion of
advertising demand at the platform 1 post-merger due to reduced prices. Therefore, one finds
that advertising surplus rises post-merger. The above proposition confirms the Media See-Saw
result that Anderson & Peitz (2020) finds as a result of a merger. We find that platform profits
are aligned with the advertising side profits while consumers are hurt as a result of the merger.
6 Merger Theories of Harm and potential remedies
In such markets, consumer price is not a variable of competition as it is set at zero. This creates
a regulatory grey area as traditionally competition authorities have focused on a merger’s
impact on prices (recently on innovation incentives) and thereby able to quantify the damage
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to consumers. For instance, most of the tools are focused towards a consumer price such as the
tool for market definition (SSNIP)27, the upward pricing pressure test (UPP) among others.
This leads to a regulatory quagmire for the anti-trust authorities which must often balance
public, political and commercial interests.
Under such circumstances, the quantification and identification of potential harm and sug-
gestion of effective remedies is paramount. As suggested in the Scott Morton et al. (2019), a
mistake in the approval process in such markets could have long-lasting effects.28 We agree with
Waehrer (2016) regarding the use of platform quality as a measure of competitive intensity on
the consumer side. We are also well aware of the ambiguity in defining good or bad quality of
a platform’s services. As the OECD (2018a) rightly points out quality is subjective, multidi-
mensional and often hard to quantify in comparison prices. However, some of the measures of
quality in the online market can be measured just as easily as advertising prices. For instance,
advertising intensity to consumers. Advertising intensity per customer for a unit of time spent
on a platform is relatively easy to quantify.
An important takeaway from our analysis is that a merger between two competing platforms
makes the advertising prices intransigent in consumer side network effects. This result presents
a very bleak outcome for consumers. Platform profits are rising in the value generated by
consumers on the advertising side. This implies platforms have the incentive to implement
strategies that increase advertising side value from each consumer affiliated to the platform.
As a consequence of this, consumers are specially vulnerable to exploitative behavior by the
merged platform in order to increase its profits. The merged entity would be unchecked in its
ability to increase its profits to the detriment of consumer welfare. A platform could employ
multiple strategies towards this. Such strategies include more frequent and longer advertise-
ments, improved consumer targeting, better analytics tools as well as a significant increase in
consumer data collection. The latter could result in onerous and invasive privacy terms dictated
to consumers to the benefit of advertisers. We discuss possible consumer harm arising from a
merger and the potential behavioral remedies to correct for them.
Theory of Harm: Post-merger advertising intensity increases
The merged entity is not constrained by a rival platform in setting its advertising prices. It
internalizes the "negative advertising externality" on the rival and on equilibrium sets lower
advertising prices to attract a larger mass of advertisements on the platform. This results
in consumer harm due to increased advertisements on a platform as a direct consequence of
the merger. The simplified expression for the difference in consumer surplus in equation 8
highlights this. The fall in consumer surplus post-merger is directly linked to the difference in
the mass of advertisements pre- and post-merger. Consumer surplus clearly falls post-merger
due to increased advertisement levels on the merged platforms.
Merger remedy: Advertising caps as a merger remedy
A possible merger remedy employed by Anti-trust authorities in a setting where prices do not
play a rule might include "Advertising caps". This is also a remedy suggested by Anderson &
27The SSNIP test often plays a central role in the market definition exercise at the European Commission, See
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/2012junmarketdefinitionen.pdf
28See Scott Morton et al. (2019) pg. 16.
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Peitz (2020) that imposes on the merged entity to a binding advertisement cap level. Platforms
are thus unable to subject consumers to an advertisement intensity (for instance, number of
advertisements per consumer per unit spent on the platform) above a certain pre-determined
and agreed upon level. It will always be up to debate what the level of advertisement intensity
should be. It is obvious that due to Media see-saws in this setting any advertising cap that is
binding will hurt platforms. This result mirrors Anderson & Peitz (2020) where an advertise-
ment cap if binding, benefits consumers, hurts advertising firms and platforms. However, one
must take into account that the two platforms do not compete for consumers (post-merger) and
their incentives are aligned in favor of the advertisers while consumers interests are ignored.
We suggest a regulatory policy of limiting advertisements as on TV networks should be imple-
mented for such platforms.29 In particular, we suggest that the firms must commit to keeping
the advertising intensity at the pre-merger levels. This does not degrade consumer experience
on a platform while advertising side’s surplus is also unchanged (as advertising price would be
set at pre-merger levels). Through such a strategy, in comparison to pre-merger, both consumer
side’s and advertising side’s welfare is unchanged post-merger.
Theory of Harm: Post-merger consumer data extraction increases
A digital platform’s ease and ability to extract such data is a hotly debated topic in almost
every policy circle and jurisdiction concerned with the ability and the possible abuse of con-
sumer data to the detriment of consumers. In our setting, a merged platform if unchecked
by competition will have the incentive to extract large amounts of consumer data if such data
increased advertisers’ willingness to pay and hence increased its profits. Moreover, since con-
sumers find such platforms indispensable for their daily use30, these platforms will be easily able
to set exploitative and intrusive data extraction terms and conditions for use of the services.31
Moreover, since consumers do not have any viable alternatives they will no option but to accept
the terms.32 Thereby resulting in loss of control over their own data.
Merger remedy: Limits on data extraction as a merger remedy
From the analysis, it is straightforward that post-merger platforms do not consider consumer
side network effects when making pricing decisions. Instead, only the advertising side network
effect, φ, is considered. Also, the Media See-Saw is such that platform and advertising firm
side profits are aligned. Therefore, firms might employ strategies to increase advertising side
per-consumer gain φ. Such strategies can include a larger amount of consumer data extraction
that allows better targeting of consumers. This might result in an increase φ. The impact of
such a strategy to increase φ does not consider the impact on the consumer side. Such increased
data extraction activity might also increase γ and therefore reduce consumer disutility from
advertisements.33 Thus, creating a harm for consumer post-merger due to disregard of consumer
29See for example, EU directive 97.
30See Brynjolfsson et al. (2019) for a discussion on how valuable these services are for consumers.
31See Reyna (2018) that suggests a lack of competition between platforms will allow platforms to reduce privacy
without losing consumers or revenue.
32See Scott Morton et al. (2019) for a discussion on barriers to entry and expansion due to network effects.
33Consumers value for privacy is a well established fact, see Britainthinks (2018). Also, the entry of online
search platform that protect consumer privacy such as Duck Duck go are evidence that consumers value
such services.
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interests due to the merger in favor of increasing platform profits. We suggest that regulators
must take pro-active action to ensure privacy of consumers is ensured through maintenance of
data extraction limits at the competitive levels post-merger. Any post-merger increase in data
extraction must be well justified by the gains they provide consumers.
7 Extensions
7.1 Multi-homing consumers
Multi-homing of consumers is an important feature of online markets. It has also been discussed
extensively in the literature such as Athey et al. (2016), Belleflamme & Peitz (2019a), Bakos
& Halaburda (2019) and others.34. We discuss this setting not only due to theoretical curiosity
but also because of its ability to provide insights as to how a monopolist with demand expansion
might price on the advertising side.
In the benchmark model, we assumed consumers single-home and platforms compete for such
consumers. In this subsection, we describe a setting where consumers multi-home where same-
side and cross-side network effects interact. Multi-homing of consumers implies that platforms
do not compete with each other for consumers. With the absence of the competitive constraint,
platforms are freely able to set advertising prices to maximize profits. As a result, this setting
can also sheds light on how platform pricing interacts with network effects when the market
consists of only one zero pricing platform which has negligible competitive constraints.
The utility of a multi-homing consumers denoted by umh is as follows:
umh = 2v − γ(A1 + A2) + θ(g1 · ED1 + g2 · ED2). (10)
For simplicity, I assume that consumer utility from multi-homing on the platforms is additive.
This impacts the result only quantitatively while preserving its qualities nature.35
In the model, consumers decide whether to multi-home or singlehome given their type s.
It is important to mention here that the mass of multi-homing consumers is the overlapping
consumer demand on both platforms. To obtain the mass of consumers active, we compare
u1 to u
mh and u2 to u
mh. We place a restriction on the parameters of the model such that
the additional value of joining the second platform is sufficiently low. Essentially, we want to
focus on the interesting case where both single-homing and multi-homing consumers exist.36
Therefore, under sufficiently low additional value of joining a platform, an agent with a strong
relative preference to platform i finds single-homing on platform i more valuable than multi-
homing, i.e. u1 > u
mh. Therefore, we get the consumer that is indifferent between multi-homing
and single-homing on platform 1 as
s < s∗1(g1, g2) := 2(γ · A2 − g2θ · ED2 − v), (11)
34Other recent works include Ambrus et al. (2016), Calvano & Polo (2019), D’Annunzio & Russo (2019),
Anderson et al. (2018), Choi (2010), Choi et al. (2017), Carroni et al. (2019)
35Any discount on consumer interaction with overlapping consumers will not change the results.
36The case where all consumers multi-home is not very interesting as consumer demand and advertising prices
is a corner solution while we focus on an interior solution.
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and, similarly, u2 > u
M when
s > s∗2(g2, g1) := 2(v − γA1 + g1θED1). (12)
The above results in single-homing demand on platform 1 as Dsh1 = F (s
∗
1) and on platform
2 as Dsh2 = 1 − F (s
∗
2). The multi-homing or overlapping consumer demand is denoted as
Dmh = F (s∗2)− F (s
∗
1). Therefore, total demand on a platform is Di = D
sh
i +D
mh for i ∈ 1, 2.
It is straightforward to see that consumer demand on a platform does not interact with
consumer demand on the other platform. For instance, the demand on platform 1 is
D1 = F (2(v − γA1 + θg1ED1)) (13)
The total consumer demand on a platform is a function of the consumer and advertising de-
mands only on that platform. Therefore, the platforms behave as monopolists without any
externality generated by the presence of the "rival".
We make the following assumption to ensure an interior solution for prices.
Assumption 4. We assume 1 > 2f(s)θ.
Proposition 8. The change in prices with respect to network externalities is a follows:
• An increase in same side network effect θ leads to an increase advertising prices ∂p
∗
∂θ
> 0
and ∂A
∂θ
> 0.
• An increase in disutility from the presence of advertisers γ leads to an increase advertising
prices ∂p
∗
∂γ
> 0 and ∂A
∂θ
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix 9.8.
As discussed before this setting mirrors a monopolist platform setting. This is because the
consumer and advertising demands only depend on own prices. We find that advertising prices
rise as same side network effects (θ) rise as well as in the case when the negative cross-side
network effects (γ) rise. It is interesting to note that the change in prices with respect to network
effects is in the same direction as in the competitive setting. This qualitative equivalence of
the results is, however, due to reasons different from those in the competitive setting.
In competitive setting, advertising price increases because competition creates an upwards
pressure on prices so as to reduce advertising intensity on platform. In the monopolist platform
(multi-homing consumers) setting, an increase in advertising price due to an increase in same-
side network effects is due to increased consumer demand on that platform. The monopolist
then sets prices to extract a portion of the increased advertising side profits by increasing prices.
This is the classical result in an elastic demand setting where monopoly price rises due to an
increase in quality of a good. An increase in consumer disutility from advertisements increases
advertising prices to reduce the advertisements on a platform so as to balance the tension of
consumer attraction and rent extraction.
7.2 Platforms with consumer congestion (g1 = g2 = −1)
The model we employ is very general and allows us to understand competition in a broader
set of market configurations than discussed before. One such configuration is when consumers
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create negative externality (gi = gj = −1) on each other.
37 We call this consumer congestion
externality and try to understand how this impacts competition in two settings when advertise-
ments are viewed as nuisance (γ > 0) and when advertisements/content is viewed positively (in
our case γ < 0). A crude example of the latter platform could be holiday room rental platforms
such as Airbnb where consumers do not enjoy congestions but value the presence of the other
side.
7.2.1 Consumer congestion with negative cross-network benefits
In this case, consumers are hit negatively by cross-network effects from advertisers and from
the congestion other consumers create on a platform. In the following proposition, we provide
some insights on how prices react to a change in network effects.
Proposition 9. In a market with consumer congestion (g1 = g2 = −1) and advertisements
being a nuisance, price dynamics in network effects are as follows:
• Advertising price falls with a rise in θ: (
∂p∗
1
∂θ
< 0)
• Advertising price falls with a rise in γ: (
∂p∗
1
∂γ
> 0)
Proof. See appendix 9.7.
We find that in the case of an increase in advertising disutility the intuition is similar as in
the benchmark model. This is because an increase in γ creates a disutility on consumers which
puts competitive pressure on platforms to reduce advertisement intensity. The more interesting
result is the fall in prices with an increase in θ. In the current subsection, consumers create
negative externalities due to their presence on other consumers on a platform. Therefore, plat-
forms seek to discourage too many consumers from joining a platform. They would encourage
the marginal consumer to migrate to the rival and create a negative externality on the rival. A
unilateral decrease in advertising price at a platform increases advertisement intensity at the
platform. This makes the marginal consumer worse-off and migrate to the rival. Similar to the
benchmark case but not quiet similar, the total value of the consumer on platform is sum of
the positive value the consumer creates on the advertising side and the negative impact they
create on other consumers.
7.2.2 Consumer congestion with positive cross-network benefits
In this case, consumers are positively impacted by cross-network effects (γ < 0) from the
advertisers and negatively impacted by the congestion other consumers create on a platform.
In the following proposition, we provide some insights on how prices react to a change in network
effects.
Proposition 10. In a market with consumer congestion (g1 = g2 = −1) and advertisements
positively valued by consumers (i.e. γ < 0), price dynamics in network effects are as follows:
• Advertising price falls with a rise in θ: (
∂p∗
1
∂θ
> 0)
37This externality can also be a proxy for competition between agents on that platform. An increase in θ would
imply increased competition.
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• Advertising price falls with a rise in |γ|: (
∂p∗
1
∂γ
< 0)
The proof for the above is straightforward and therefore omitted.38 The above results provide
an insight on how equilibrium prices behave when consumers value positively advertisements
(or interaction with agents on the other side) while creating a negative externality on other
consumers. We find that an increase in consumer congestion externality leads to an increase in
advertising price. The intuition for this is similar to its counterpart in the previous subsection
with γ > 0. Since θ is negative, a platform seeks to steer away the marginal consumer to
the rival platform. The platform does so by increasing its advertising price, thereby, reducing
consumer valued advertising on a platform. This reduces the relative value of a platform for
the marginal consumer.
An increase in |γ| leads to an increase in consumer utility enhancing advertisements. The
intuition for this result is the same as in the literature (see Armstrong (2006)) on two sided
markets with positive cross-network externalities. An increase in consumer valuation of the
other side increases competition for the other side and thereby reducing the price to increase
the presence of the advertisements.
7.2.3 Discussion on consumer welfare: The failure of competition
In the setting where consumers exert a congestion externality on one another, we find that
competition leads to consumers being doubly hurt. This is the case regardless of whether
consumers find advertisement a nuisance (γ > 0) or the case when consumers find advertisement
valuable (γ < 0). In both these cases, competition acts against consumers and hurts them. We
highlight a unique case where competition fails to protect the interest of consumers and hurts
them overall. Media see-saws often imply an increase in welfare of one side of the market while
the other side loss and the overall impact on welfare might not be clear. However, we find that
in a setting where consumers value positively the presence of advertisements, both consumers
and advertisers are worse off due to competition with an increase in consumer nuisance. We
summarize the results in the proposition below and discuss in detail below.
Proposition 11. When consumers create congestion externality on each other, (g1 = g2 = −1),
an increase in consumer congestion externality
• when γ ≥ 0, leads to a decrease in consumer surplus and increases advertiser surplus.
• when γ < 0, leads to a fall in both consumer surplus and advertising surplus.
We provide the intuition for these results below.
Case: Consumers find advertisements a nuisance (γ > 0) In the case, an increase in
θ or consumer congestion leads to further loss in consumer welfare due to increased advertise-
ment. An increased advertising intensity on a platform discourages consumer affiliation with
a platform. However, competition leads to increase in advertising intensity with an increase
in consumer congestion. In the current setting where consumers create a negative externality
on each consumers experience increased negative externality due to the presence of other con-
sumers. This is further compounded by the increase in advertising intensity on platforms due
38A curious reader could use the expressions in appendix 9.7 and make the appropriate changes to obtain the
results.
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to competition to steer away the marginal consumer to the rival. As a result, advertisers are
positively impacted but consumers are hurt doubly. This provides a clear example of how com-
petition might fail to protect consumer interests and instead be detrimental to them. However,
one might dispute the total impact on welfare as welfare of advertiser surplus increases.
Case: Consumers value advertisements positively (γ < 0) In this case, an increase
in θ or consumer congestion leads to further loss in consumer welfare due to a decrease in con-
sumer enhancing advertisements. This is because a platform seeks to discourage the marginal
consumer affiliating with the platform. It does so by increasing the advertisement prices and
reducing consumer utility by decreasing the mass of positively valued advertisements on the
platform. This makes joining that platform less attractive relative to the rival for the marginal
consumer. The rival also responds similarly and increases prices. We find that on equilib-
rium, an consumers are worse-off due to increased negative value from the presence of other
consumers as well as lower mass of active advertisers on a platform that increase consumer
valuation. In this setting, both consumers and advertisers are hurt doubly with an increase in
consumer congestion. Here, there does not exist any Media See saw. This result is due to the
competitive pressure platforms exert on each other to increase advertising prices. Here, clearly
the consumer surplus, advertising surplus and overall industry surplus is lowered. This is the
worst case scenario where competition fails spectacularly and hurts all players in the market.
It is our understanding that in this case policy makers must pro-actively intervene to correct
this competitive anomaly.
The case for a Monopoly The results in this subsection provide evidence that competition
between firms, in markets where the price to consumers is zero, actually leads to a detrimental
effect on consumer welfare. This is more so in the case when consumers value positively the other
side. This new counterintuitive behavior of competition must be taken into account by anti-trust
authorities during merger proceedings. Platforms with consumer congestion present a unique
case where we suggest that a monopoly be consumer welfare enhancing. When consumers
derive utility from the presence of the other side (advertisers) then a merger to a monopoly
between two zero pricing platforms is expected to be consumer surplus, advertising surplus and
platform profit enhancing. In such setting, anti-trust authorities should be more pliable to a
merger that reduces competition and strongly consider the positive effects of such a merger on
all the parties.
8 Conclusions
In recent times, large online platforms such as Google and Facebook have emerged that are
often indispensable to consumers. They offer "free" consumer access to platform services while
charging advertisers for access to consumers. These platforms are very large and yet do not
set a (direct) price to consumers. This creates a regulatory grey area as anti-trust authorities
are unsure how to assess competition between such platforms. In this paper, we tried to fill
this gap by providing insights on the mechanics of comeptition between firms that compete for
consumers and earn through advertising revenues. We show that as consumer side externalities
(negative advertising externality and same-side externality) rise the intensity of advertisements
on a platform falls. This is because these firms compete for consumers by reducing advertising
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intensity. We then look at how a merger might impact competition. We show that post-
merger platforms do not care about consumer utility and their incentives are aligned with the
advertising side. This creates a harm to consumers even in a setting where consumer facing
price is zero. This is because the harm incident on the consumer is implicit through increased
advertising. We find that platforms might use strategies to increase advertising side profits
and this could be to the detriment of consumers. Post-merger consumers are vulnerable to
exploitation by platforms to increase profits in favor of the advertising side. We also discuss a
few theories of harm associated with merger and the associated remedies that include advertising
caps and data extraction limits.
We also look at multiple extensions to the benchmark model. Firstly, we look at multi-homing
consumers as this setting provides insights on a monopolist platform with elastic demand and
provide insights on the pricing strategy of platforms. Next, we look at the case when consumers
experience congestion externalities where there dislike the presence of other consumers. In
this setting, competition between platforms acts against consumer interest. This result is
compounded in a setting where consumers value the presence of advertising (content) side while
presenting a congestion externality on each other. Competition negatively impacts consumers
as well as content providers (which are positively valued by consumers). Competition leads to
a clear loss in welfare.
This paper could be extended to look at the interesting case when platforms are able to
discriminate between consumers in terms of advertising intensity. This extension might even
lead to increased competition between the platforms as in the standard price discrimination
literature. However, the two-sidedness of the model will reveal new insights.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The derivative of ∂A1(g1,g2)
∂p1
∂A1(g1, g2)
∂p1
= λ(k1)
[
φ
∂D1(g1, g2)
∂p1
− 1
]
(14)
∂A2(g2, g1)
∂p1
= λ(k2)
[
φ
∂D2(g2, g1)
∂p1
]
= −λ(k2)
[
φ
∂D1(g1, g2)
∂p1
]
(15)
∂D1(g1, g2)
∂p1
= f(s∗)
[
θ
(
g1
∂D1(g1, g2)
∂p1
− g2
∂D2(g1, g2)
∂p1
)
− γ[
∂A1(g1, g2)
∂p1
−
∂A2(g2, g1)
∂p1
]
(16)
substituting ∂A1(g1,g2)
∂p1
and ∂A2(g2,g1)
∂p1
into ∂D1(g1,g2)
∂p1
and simplifying we get
∂D1(g1, g2)
∂p1
= f(s∗)
[∂D1(g1, g2)
∂p1
[θ(g1 + g2)− γφ(λ(k1) + λ(k2))] + γλ(k1)
]
(17)
solving for ∂D1
∂p1
, we get
∂D1
∂p1
=
f(s∗)γλ(k1)
1− f(s∗)(θ(g1 + g2)− γφ(λ(k1) + λ(k2)))
> 0 (18)
substituting, this into ∂A1
∂p1
, we get
∂A1
∂p1
=
λ(k1)[f(s
∗)(θ(g1 + g2)− γφλ(k2))− 1]
1− f(s∗)(θ(g1 + g2)− γφ(λ(k1) + λ(k2)))
< 0 (19)
Under a symmetric equilibrium where g1 = g2 = g, we have s
∗ = 0, k∗ = φ/2− p∗, we get
∂A1
∂p1
=
λ(k∗)[f(s∗)(2g · θ − γφλ(k∗))− 1]
1− 2f(s∗)(g · θ − γφλ(k∗))
< 0 (20)
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9.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. For the case when g1 = g2 = 0, we have that
∂D1
∂p1
=
f(s∗)γλ(k1)
1 + f(s∗)γφ(λ(k1) + λ(k2))
> 0 (21)
substituting, this into ∂A1
∂p1
, we get
∂A1
∂p1
=
−λ(k1)[f(s
∗)γφλ(k2) + 1]
1 + f(s∗)γφ(λ(k1) + λ(k2))
< 0 (22)
Under a symmetric equilibrium s∗ = 0, k∗ = φ/2− p∗, we get
∂A1
∂p1
=
−λ(k∗)[f(s∗)γφλ(k∗) + 1]
1 + 2f(s∗)γφλ(k∗)
We then substitute the above expression into the first order condition to get an implicit functions
that characterizes the equilibrium prices.
9.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. In the following, we provide the comparative static with respect to φ and γ.
Using implicit function theorem, we obtain the comparative static with respect to a parameter
µ ∈ {φ, γ} as
∂p∗
∂µ
=
∂2Π∗
∂p1∂µ
( ∂
2Π∗
∂p1∂p2
− ∂
2Π∗
∂p2
)
(∂
2Π∗
∂p2
)2 − (
∂2Π∗
1
∂p1∂p2
)2
For the above expression, we exploit symmetry of the model and simplify. It is easy to see that
since |
∂2Π∗
1
∂p2
| > |
∂2Π∗
1
∂p1∂p2
|, the sign of ∂p
∗
∂µ
follows the sign of ∂
2Π∗
∂p1∂µ
for µ ∈ {γ}. Thereafter, we only
look at the direct effect of a parameter to prove the sign of the prices.
To show δp
∗
δγ
> 0
∂2Π∗1
∂p1∂γ
=
∂A∗1
∂γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+p∗1
∂2A1
∂p1∂γ
.
∂A1
∂γ
= λ(k∗)
[
φ
∂2D1
∂p1∂γ
]
The simplified expression for ∂
2D1
∂p1∂γ
is as follows
∂2D1
∂p1∂γ
=
f(s∗)λ(k)
(1 + f(s∗)γφ(λ(k1) + λ(k2)))2
> 0
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9.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. For the case when g1 = g2 = 1, we get
∂D1
∂p1
= f(s∗)
[∂D1
∂p1
[2θ − γφ(λ(k1) + λ(k2))] + γλ(k1)
]
(23)
solving for ∂D1
∂p1
, we get
∂D1
∂p1
=
f(s∗)γλ(k1)
1− f(s∗)(2θ − γφ(λ(k1) + λ(k2)))
> 0 (24)
substituting, this into ∂A1
∂p1
, we get
∂A1
∂p1
=
λ(k1)[f(s
∗)(2θ − γφλ(k2))− 1]
1− f(s∗)(2θ − γφ(λ(k1) + λ(k2)))
< 0 (25)
Under a symmetric equilibrium s∗ = 0, k∗ = φ/2− p∗, we get
∂A1
∂p1
=
λ(k∗)[f(s∗)(2θ − γφλ(k2))− 1]
1− 2f(s∗)(θ − γφλ(k∗))
< 0 (26)
9.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. In the following, we provide the comparative static with respect to θ and γ.
Using implicit function theorem, we obtain the comparative static with respect to a parameter
µ ∈ {φ, γ, θ} as
∂p∗
∂µ
=
∂2Π∗
∂p1∂µ
( ∂
2Π∗
∂p1∂p2
− ∂
2Π∗
∂p2
)
(∂
2Π∗
∂p2
)2 − (
∂2Π∗
1
∂p1∂p2
)2
For the above expression, we exploit symmetry of the model and simplify. It is easy to see that
since |
∂2Π∗
1
∂p2
| > |
∂2Π∗
1
∂p1∂p2
|, the sign of ∂p
∗
∂µ
follows the sign of ∂
2Π∗
∂p1∂µ
for µ ∈ {θ, γ}. Thereafter, we
only look at the direct effect of a parameter to prove the sign of the prices.
The direct effect of a parameter on prices is given as
∂2Π∗1
∂p1∂µ
=
∂A∗1
∂µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+p∗1
∂2A1
∂p1∂µ
.
Thereafter, we focus only on the sign of ∂
2A1
∂p1∂µ
for µ ∈ {θ, φ, γ}
To show ∂p
∗
∂θ
> 0 The simplified expression is given as follows
∂2A∗1
∂p1∂θ
=
2f(s∗)2λ(k∗)2γφ
(1− 2f(s∗)(θ − γφλ(k∗))2
> 0
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To show δp
∗
δγ
> 0 The simplified expression of ∂
2A1
∂p1∂γ
is given as follows
∂2A1
∂p1∂γ
= λ(k∗)
[
φ
∂2D1
∂p1∂γ
]
The simplified expression for ∂
2D1
∂p1∂γ
is as follows
∂2D1
∂p1∂γ
=
f(s∗)λ(k)(1− 2θf(s∗))
(1− 2f(s∗)X)2
where X = θ − γφλ(k∗). The above expression is positive for 1 > 2θf(s∗) and negative
otherwise.
9.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. In the following, we provide the comparative static with respect to θ and γ for the cases
g1 = g2 ∈ {0, 1}.
As in proposition 2, the sign of ∂p
M∗
∂µ
follows the sign of ∂
2ΠM∗(g,g)
∂p1∂µ
for µ ∈ {θ, γ}. Thereafter,
we only look at the direct effect of a parameter to prove the sign of the prices.
The direct effect of a parameter on prices is given as
∂2ΠM,∗1 (g, g)
∂p1∂µ
=
∂A∗1
∂µ
+ p∗1(
∂[∂A1
∂p1
]
∂µ
+
∂[∂A2
∂p1
]
∂µ
)
for µ ∈ {θ, γ} and ∂A1
∂µ
= 0.
We know that
∂A1
∂p1
= λ(k1)
[
φ
∂D1
∂p1
− 1
]
(27)
∂A2
∂p1
= −λ(k2)
[
φ
∂D1
∂p1
]
(28)
From the two expressions above, it is easy to see that
∂[
∂A1
∂p1
]
∂µ
= −
∂[
∂A2
∂p1
]
∂µ
and this gives us the
result that
∂2ΠM,∗1 (g, g)
∂p1∂µ
= 0
9.7 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. For the case of g1 = g2 = −1, we obtain the following comparative statics.
To show ∂p
∗
∂θ
< 0 The simplified expression is given as follows
∂2A∗1
∂p1∂θ
= −
2f(s∗)2λ(k∗)2γφ
(1− 2f(s∗)(θ − γφλ(k∗))2
< 0
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To show δp
∗
δγ
> 0 The simplified expression of ∂
2A1
∂p1∂γ
is given as follows
∂2A1
∂p1∂γ
= −λ(k∗)
[
φ
∂2D1
∂p1∂γ
]
The simplified expression for ∂
2D1
∂p1∂γ
is as follows
∂2D1
∂p1∂γ
=
f(s∗)λ(k)(1 + 2θf(s∗))
(1 + 2f(s∗)X)2
where X := θ + γφλ(k∗). The above expression is always positive.
9.8 Multi-homing consumers
Proof. The total consumer demand on platform 1 is given by D1 = F (s
∗
2) where s
∗
2(g) =
2(v − γA1 + θg1D1).
The advertiser demand on platform is then given by Λ(ki) where ki = φ ∗Di − pi.
The derivative of ∂A1
∂p1
∂A1
∂p1
= λ(k1)
[
φ
∂D1
∂p1
− 1
]
(29)
∂D1
∂p1
= f(s∗)2
[
θ · g ·
∂D1
∂p1
− γ
∂A1
∂p1
] (30)
substituting ∂A1
∂p1
into ∂D1
∂p1
and simplifying we get
∂D1
∂p1
=
2f(s∗)γλ(k1)
1− 2f(s∗)(θ · g1 − γφλ(k1))
> 0 (31)
substituting, this into ∂A1
∂p1
, we get
∂A1
∂p1
=
λ(k1)[2f(s
∗)θg1 − 1]
1− 2f(s∗)(θ · g1 − γφλ(k1))
< 0 (32)
The platform sets advertising prices to maximize its profits denoted by
Πi = pi ∗ Ai
The first order conditions are given as
∂Πi
∂pi
= Ai + pi ∗
∂Ai
∂pi
Comparative statics of the price
Before we proceed, it is straightforward that the direction of price change with respect to
µ ∈ {θ, γ} will be equal to the direct effect given as
sign(
∂p∗i
∂µ
) = sign(
∂2Π∗i
∂pi∂µ
) for µ ∈ {θ, γ}
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The expression for the direct effect is
∂2Π∗i
∂pi∂µ
=
∂Ai
∂µ
+ p∗i
∂2A1
∂p1∂µ
for µ ∈ {θ, φ}. (33)
We first start with the change of price in θ:
To show ∂p1
∂θ
> 0
We show the final expression of the components of equation (33). The expression for the first
component is
∂A1
∂θ
= λ(k1)φ
∂D1
∂θ
= λ(k1)φ
2g · f(s)D1
1− 2f(s)(g · θ − φγλ(k))
> 0
The expression for the second component is given as follows:.
∂2A1
∂p1∂θ
=
2λ2γφ · [f 2 · g1 +
∂f
∂θ
]− ∂λ(k)
∂θ
(2f(s)θg1 − 1)
2
[1− 2f(s)(g1 · θ − φγλ(k))]2
We know that ∂λ(k)
∂θ
= λ(k)
′
φ∂D1
∂θ
> 0 The above expression is positive for a large range of
distributions including the uniform distribution.
To show ∂p1
∂γ
> 0
We show the final expression of the components of equation (33). The expression for the first
component is
∂A1
∂θ
= λ(k1)φ
∂D1
∂γ
= λ(k1)φ
(−2A1f(s))
1− 2f(s)(g1 · θ − φγλ(k))
< 0
The expression for the second component is given as follows:.
∂2A1
∂p1∂γ
= λ(k1)φ
∂D1
∂γ
=
(1− 2θg1f(s))[f(s)λ
2φ− (1− 2θg1f(s))
∂λ
∂γ
] + 2λ(k1)γφ
∂f(s)
∂γ
[1− 2f(s)(g1 · θ − φγλ(k))]2
We know that ∂λ(k)
∂γ
= λ(k)
′
φ∂D1
∂γ
< 0, 1− 2θg1f(s) > 0. The above expression is positive for a
large range of distributions including the uniform distribution.
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9.9 Proof of Proposition
Proof. In the following, we fist provide the comparative static of price with respect to φ and
then for advertising demand Ai for the cases g1 = g2 ∈ {0, 1}.
To show ∂pi
∂φ
> 0 As in proposition 2, the sign of ∂p
M∗
∂φ
follows the sign of ∂
2ΠM∗(g,g)
∂p1∂φ
. There-
after, we only look at the direct effect of a parameter to prove the sign of the prices.
The direct effect of a parameter on prices is given as
∂2ΠM,∗1 (g, g)
∂p1∂φ
=
∂A1
∂φ
+ p∗1(
∂[∂A1
∂p1
]
∂µ
+
∂[∂A2
∂p1
]
∂µ
)
for µ ∈ {θ, γ} and ∂A1
∂µ
> 0.
We know that
∂A1
∂p1
= λ(k1)
[
φ
∂D1
∂p1
− 1
]
(34)
∂A2
∂p1
= −λ(k2)
[
φ
∂D1
∂p1
]
(35)
From the two expressions above, it is easy to see that
∂[
∂A1
∂p1
]
∂φ
= −
∂[
∂A2
∂p1
]
∂φ
and this gives us the
result that
∂2ΠM,∗1 (g, g)
∂p1∂φ
=
∂A1
∂φ
= D1 > 0
Thus, the sign of ∂pi
∂φ
> 0.
To show ∂Ai
∂φ
> 0 The expression of the above is
∂Ai
∂φ
= λ(ki)(Di + φ
∂Di
∂φ
−
∂pi
∂φ
)
In the above,
∂D∗i
∂φ
= 0
and D1 >
∂p1
∂φ
. [Show later]
9.10 A simple Hotelling set-up
9.10.1 Competing platforms
Consumers are uniformly distributed along a hotelling preference line with utility from joining
platform 1 is denoted by
u1 = v + g1 · ED1 − γA1 − t ∗ x
and from joining platform 2 is denoted by
u2 = v + g2 · ED2 − γA2 − t ∗ (1− x)
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where ED1 and ED2 are the consumer beliefs on total consumer mass on a platform.
The advertisers are also distributed uniformly according to their type k. The utility of an
advertiser of type k of joining a platform i is
vi = φ ∗Di − pi − k
Advertisers join a platform if vi > 0 implying that Ai = φ ∗Di − pi.
The indifferent consumer is then given as x∗ = 1
2
+ θ(g1·ED1−g2·ED2)−γ(A1−A2)
2t
which results
in D1 = x
∗ and D2 = 1 − x
∗. Solving the demands simultaneously and utilising the fulfilled
expectations equilibrium concept, we obtain the following demand functions in terms of prices.
Ai(gi, gj) =
φ(t− pj ∗ φ− gjθ + γφ)− pi(2t− θ(g1 + g2) + γφ)
2t− θ(g1 + g2) + 2γφ
Di(gi, gj) =
t− gj · θ + γ(pi − pj + φ)
2t− (gi + gj)θ + 2γφ
(36)
The platforms set prices to maximize profits given by
max
pi
Πi = piAi
The equilibrium price set by a platform i is given as
p∗i (gi, gj) = φ
2(t− gj · θ)(2t− (gi + gj)θ) + γφ(5t− (gi + 4gj)θ + γφ)
(4t− 2(gi + gj)θ + γφ)(4t− 2(gi + gj)θ + 3γφ)
The resulting consumer and advertiser demand for a platform is as follows.
A∗i (gi, gj) = φ
(2t− (gi + gj)θ + γφ)(2(t− gj · θ)(2t− (gi + gj)θ) + γφ(5t− (gi + 4gj)θ + γφ)
(4t− 2(gi + gj)θ + γφ)(4t− 2(gi + gj)θ + 3γφ)
D∗i (gi, gj) =
1
2
(
1 + θ(gi − gj)
4t− 2θ(gi + gj) + 3γφ
(2t− (gi + gj)θ + 2γφ)(4t− 2(gi + gj)θ + γφ))
)
(37)
The resulting equilibrium profits of a platform i is then given by
Π∗i =
φ2(2t− (gi + gj)θ + γφ)(2(t− gj · θ)(2t− (gi + gj)θ) + γφ(5t− (gi + 4gj)θ + γφ))
2
(4t− 2(gi + gj)θ + γφ)2(2t− (gi + gj)θ + 2γφ)(4t− 2θ(gi + gj) + 3γφ)2
(38)
Using the above, we can easily characterize the prices for the case when platform competition
is between two standard advertising funded platforms (g1 = g2 = 0), two social media platforms
(g1 = g2 = 1) and competition between a social media platform and a standard platform (g1 = 1
and g2 = 0).
9.10.2 Competition between standard platforms
This is the case when g1 = g2 = 0. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium which is described
below.
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p∗(0, 0) =
φ(γφ+ t)
3γφ+ 4t
The resulting consumer and advertiser demand for a platform is as follows.
N∗(0, 0) =
φ(γφ+ 2t)
6γφ+ 8t
D∗(0, 0) =
1
2
(39)
The resulting equilibrium profits of a platform i is then given by
Π∗i (0, 0) =
φ2(γφ+ t)(γφ+ 2t)
2(3γφ+ 4t)2
(40)
9.10.3 Competition between two social media platforms
This is the case when g1 = g2 = 1. We focus on a symmetric equilibrium which is described
below.
p∗(1, 1) =
φ(γφ− θ + t)
3γφ− 4θ + 4t
The resulting consumer and advertiser demand for a platform is as follows.
A∗(1, 1) =
φ(γφ− 2θ + 2t)
6γφ− 8θ + 8t
D∗(1, 1) =
1
2
(41)
The resulting equilibrium profits of a platform i is then given by
Π∗(1, 1) =
φ2(γφ− 2θ + 2t)(γφ− θ + t)
2(3γφ− 4θ + 4t)2
(42)
9.10.4 Competition between a standard platform and a social media platform
This is the case when g1 = 1 and g2 = 0. The equilibrium prices, advertisement demand and
consumer demand are asymmetric and given below.
p∗1(1, 0) =
φ (γφ(γφ− θ) + 4t2 + t(5γφ− 2θ))
(γφ− 2θ + 4t)(3γφ− 2θ + 4t)
p∗2(0, 1) =
φ (γ2φ2 − 4γθφ+ 2θ2 + 4t2 + 5γtφ− 6θt)
(γφ− 2θ + 4t)(3γφ− 2θ + 4t)
(43)
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The resulting consumer and advertiser demand for a platform is as follows.
A∗1(1, 0) =
φ(γφ− θ + 2t) (γφ(γφ− θ) + 4t2 + t(5γφ− 2θ))
(γφ− 2θ + 4t)(2γφ− θ + 2t)(3γφ− 2θ + 4t)
A∗2(0, 1) =
φ(γφ− θ + 2t) (γ2φ2 − 4γθφ+ 2θ2 + 4t2 + 5γtφ− 6θt)
(γφ− 2θ + 4t)(2γφ− θ + 2t)(3γφ− 2θ + 4t)
D∗1(1, 0) =
1
6
(
θ
(
1
2γφ− θ + 2t
+
4
γφ− 2θ + 4t
)
+ 3
) (44)
The resulting equilibrium profits of a platform i is then given by
Π∗1(1, 0) =
φ2(γφ− θ + 2t) (γφ(γφ− θ) + 4t2 + t(5γφ− 2θ))
2
(γφ− 2θ + 4t)2(2γφ− θ + 2t)(3γφ− 2θ + 4t)2
Π∗2(0, 1) =
φ2(γφ− θ + 2t) (γ2φ2 − 4γθφ+ 2θ2 + 4t2 + 5γtφ− 6θt)
2
(γφ− 2θ + 4t)2(2γφ− θ + 2t)(3γφ− 2θ + 4t)2
(45)
We find that the following
p∗1(1, 0)− p
∗
2(0, 1) =
θφ
γφ− 2θ + 4t
A∗1(1, 0)− A
∗
2(0, 1) =
θφ(γφ− θ + 2t)
(γφ− 2θ + 4t)(2γφ− θ + 2t)
> 0
D∗1(1, 0)−D
∗
2(0, 1) =
θφ(γφ− θ + 2t)
(γφ− 2θ + 4t)(2γφ− θ + 2t)
> 0
(46)
9.10.5 Merger between competing platforms
In this subsection, we look at the case when there is a merger between platforms. This merger
can be between two standard platforms (g1 = g2 = 0), two social media platforms (g1 = g2 = 1)
or between a social media platform and a standard platform (g1 = 1 and g2 = 0). The merged
entity sets prices to maximize
max
p1,p2
ΠM(g1, g2) = p1A1 + p2A2 (47)
The equilibrium price, advertisement and consumer demand on the merged platform is given
as
pM∗i (gi, g2) = φ
t− gjθ
4t− 2(g1 + g2)θ
AM∗i (gi, gj) =
φ(t− gjθ + γφ)
4t− 2(g1 + g2)θ + 4γφ
DM∗i (gi, gj) =
t− gjθ + γφ
4t−(gi+3gj)θ
4t−2(g1+g2)
2t− (g1 + g2)θ + 2γφ
(48)
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The corresponding profit of the merged platform is given as
ΠM∗i (gi, gj) =
φ2 (θ (θ (g21 + g
2
2)− γφ(g1 + g2))− 2θt(g1 + g2) + 2t
2 + 2γtφ)
4(2t− θ(g1 + g2))(2γφ− θ(g1 + g2) + 2t)
(49)
Now, we can easily look at the counterparts when gi = gj ∈ {0, 1} and gi 6= gj.
9.10.6 Merger of two competing standard platforms or two social media platforms
In the case of two standard platforms g1 = g2 = g ∈ {0, 1}, the symmetric equilibrium price,
advertisement and consumer demand on the merged platform is given as
pM∗(g, g) =
φ
4
AM∗(g, g) =
φ
4
DM∗(g, g) = 1/2
(50)
The corresponding profit is given as
ΠM∗i (g, g) =
φ2
8
(51)
The consumer and producer surplus is given as
CSM∗(g, g) =
4v − γφ+ 2g · θ − t
4
PSM∗(g, g) =
φ2
16
(52)
9.10.7 Merger of a Social media platform and a standard platform
In the case of two standard platforms g1 = 1 and g2 = 0, the equilibrium price, advertisement
and consumer demands are asymmetric on a platform is given as
pM∗1 (1, 0) =
tφ
4t− 2θ
pM∗2 (0, 1) =
φ(t− θ)
4t− 2θ
AM∗1 (1, 0) =
φ(γφ+ t)
4γφ− 2θ + 4t
AM∗2 (0, 1) =
φ(γφ− θ + t)
4γφ− 2θ + 4t
DM∗1 (1, 0) =
−γθφ+ 4t2 + 4γtφ− 2θt
2(2t− θ)(2γφ− θ + 2t)
(53)
36
and DM∗2 (0, 1) = 1−D
M∗
1 (1, 0). The corresponding profit is given as
ΠM∗i (1, 0) =
φ2 (−γθφ+ θ2 + 2t2 + 2γtφ− 2θt)
4(2t− θ)(2γφ− θ + 2t)
(54)
The consumer and producer surplus is given as
CSM∗(1, 0) = v +
(
−4γφ−
(4t−θ)(2θ2+4t2−7θt)
(θ−2t)2
+ 2θ
2(θ−3t)
(θ−2t)(2γφ−θ+2t)
+ θ
2t
(−2γφ+θ−2t)2
)
16
PSM∗(1, 0) =
φ2 (2γ2φ2 − 2γθφ+ θ2 + 2t2 + 4γtφ− 2θt)
8(−2γφ+ θ − 2t)2
(55)
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